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Abstract This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing
behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation.
We focus on describing conict technology using Lanchesters equations and
study the role of collectivityof punishment to support cooperation in large
groups. The main results suggest that as long as defectors are, even slightly,
less collectivethan punishers, Lanchesters law can be applied to show that
a smaller proportion of punishers can successfully eliminate defectors as the
size of the population increases.
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1 Introduction
Provisions of public goods in a community, revolutionary activities to over-
throw corrupt and ine¢ cient governments, and more generally various actions
that members of a group take to achieve a common goal have all been exam-
ined extensively by social scientists under the name of collective action. Group
size has played an important role in explaining collective action. A standard
argument put forward by Olson (1965) asserts that a larger group faces more
di¢ culties in achieving a common goal compared to a smaller group, because
of an aggravated free-rider problem: unless the number of individuals in a
group is quite small ... rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests(Olson, 1965, p.2).
Since then, studies of the relationship between group size and the provision
of collective goods have been conducted by various researchers (Chamberlin,
1974; Marwell and Pamela, 1993; McGuire, 1974; Oliver and Marwell, 1988;
Sandler, 1992; Agrawal and Goyal, 2001; Esteban and Ray, 1999). Chamberlin
(1974) emphasizes the distinction between goods with perfect non-rivalness
and goods with rivalness of consumption among nonexcludable goods. With
this distinction he argues that Olsons claim that larger groups would provide
fewer public goods only holds for goods with perfect rivalness. In the case of
goods with non-rivalness, Chamberlin shows that as group size increases, the
amount of total contribution, in absolute terms, would increase. This view
  that the Olson thesis holds when the collective good is private but may
be reversed when the good is purely public   was initiated by Chamberlin
and substantiated by others (Chamberlin, 1974; Marwell and Pamela, 1993;
McGuire, 1974; Oliver and Marwell, 1988; Sandler, 1992); it is called common
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wisdomby Esteban and Ray (2001)
Esteban and Ray (2001) examine the group size e¤ect using a model with
intergroup conicts. In particular, they show that under plausible assumptions
about costs, the winning probabilities of a larger group is greater than that
of a smaller group even if the prize is purely private. However, the context in
which they examine collective action   competition between several groups  
may be more relevant in some instances, but it is neither a general situation
nor the situation that Olson considers.
A variety of empirical or experimental studies have also examined the group
size hypothesis (Isaac andWalker, 1988; Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Isaac et al.,
1994; Hann and Koorema, 2002; Carpenter, 2007) and many of them nd that
the size of a group is positively related to its level of collective action(Marwell
and Pamela, 1993, p.38). Hann and Koorema (2002) use data from a candy bar
honor system in 166 rms in the Netherlands and nd evidence that free riding
decreases with group size. Carpenter (2007) tests the group size hypothesis
when punishment is allowed and nds that large groups contribute at rates
no lower than small groups because punishment does not fall appreciably in
large groups(Carpenter, 2007, p.31). In sum, even though various empirical
and experimental studies suggest that large groups may perform better, few
theoretical works provide the logic and reasoning of how larger groups can
overcome an aggravated free-rider problem.
We examine critically the traditional understanding of the role of group
size in collective action, when members of the population punish defectors in
a public goods game. Particularly, we focus on describing conict technology
using Lanchesters equations and study the role of collectivityof punishment
to support cooperation in large groups. Boehm (1982) introduces and empha-
3
sizes the functioning of collective punishment or sanctioning in maintaining
social norms:
... group sanction emerged as the most powerful instrument for reg-
ulation of individually assertive behaviors, particularly those which
very obviously disrupted cooperation or disturbed social equilib-
rium needed for group stability. (Boehm, 1982, p.146)
The idea of using Lanchesters equations in explaining collective action is
not new; biologists have been applying Lanchesters law to collective action
among animals. For example, Franks and Partridge (1993) use Lanchesters
square law to explain why predatory army ants rely on large numbers of work-
ers that are smaller than their prey. In the context of human collective action
problems, Bingham (1999, 2000) invokes Lanchesters square law to claim that
the cost of punishment decreases exponentially as the number of punishers be-
comes larger. He argues that the remote killing ability of humans and their
precursors   the special capacity of the human species to kill at a distance
from its target   enables a large number of punishers to attack a single cheater
simultaneously, and hence Lanchesters square law applies.
We observe that Binghams point is valid only in the situation where a large
number of punishers face a single cheater. Because the number of punishers
is not always large even in a large group, it is not clear whether the same
argument can carry over to the collective action problem in large groups. In
addition, there is no reason to expect that only punishers can concentrate on
attacking, when punishers and defectors engage in conict. Thus the remote
killing competence may be a necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for the
large group e¤ect.
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In this paper we adopt the collective punishment hypothesis and develop a
simple model of a public goods game with punishment. We combine the stan-
dard evolutionary model of three behavioral types   cooperator, punisher, and
defector   with the Lanchester-type conict between punishers and defectors
(Bowles and Choi, 2002; Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Bingham, 1999, 2000; Pan-
chanathan and Boyd, 2004; Sethi and Somanathan, 2006). We introduce a
parameter to capture the degree of collectivity among punishers who en-
gage the defectors, and study the conditions for the group size e¤ect. We nd
that group size has a positive e¤ect in supporting higher levels of cooperation.
More surprisingly, we show that as long as the defector type is even slightly
less collective than the punisher type, the large group e¤ect prevails. Thus,
we may conclude that the large group e¤ect is quite robust, considering that
the defector type, because of its behavioral disposition, would be reluctant to
participate in any type of collective action. The organization of the paper is as
follows. Section 2 reminds readers of Lanchesters equations and Lanchesters
square law. We present the model in section 3 and discuss implications and
extensions of the model in section 4.
2 Lanchesters Law and an Illustrating
Example
Suppose that x combatants of army A engage y combatants of army B.
The time evolutions of x; y are given by Lanchesters equations (Lanchester,
1916, p.20):
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dx
dt
=  y; dy
dt
=  x (1)
where  and  denote the ghting e¤ectiveness of each army. Equation (1)
is derived from the assumption that the number of persons knocked out per
unit time is directly proportional to the numerical size of the opposing force;
during each unit of time, t, the opposing force of magnitude y concentrates
on the elimination of x; so x = yt. Engel (1954) and Samz (1972) verify
the validity of Lanchesters equation in an actual combat situation where U.S.
forces captured the island of Iwo Jima during World War II. The solution of
di¤erential equations (1) is well-described by a function, H(x; y):
H(x; y) =

2
x2   
2
y2; (2)
in the following sense. When we evaluate H(x; y) at the solutions of (1),
its value only depends on the initial values; i.e. H(x(t); y(t)) = 
2
(x(t))2  

2
(y(t))2 = 
2
x20   2y20 for all t > 0: Using this relation we can construct time
paths of all solutions starting from various initial values (see gure 1).
We suppose that one army wins a battle if the other army vanishes rst;
i.e. army A wins the battle at time T; if (x(T ))2 > (y(T ))2; or equivalently
x20 > y
2
0 where x0 and y0 are initial values for x and y: So, the result of
battles depends on the squares of the initial numbers of armies, which is called
Lanchesters square law. Similarly, if army B divides evenly and, accordingly,
army A engages twice with half
 
y0
2

of the original army B, army A wins
both battles if x20 
 
y0
2
2
> 
 
y0
2
2
; where the left-hand side represents the
square of the remaining combatants in army A after the rst engagement. In
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Figure 1: Solution curves for Lanchesters equation. Each line corresponds
to each solution of Lanchesters equation. If the system starts from a, it will reach b ; so
army B defeats army A. By constrast, the system, starting from c; predicts the winning of
army A. We set  =  = 1.
general when army B is divided by n we obtain the following rule:
x20 > 
y20
n
(3)
Now consider a population which consists of defectors, punishers, and pos-
sibly cooperators. For concreteness, suppose that 50% of the population are
defectors and suppose that a punishment process   where the punishers elim-
inate defectors and defectors counteract   is described by Lanchesters equa-
tions with  = . We assume that the defectors behave individually, so the
divisor in the left side of (3), n; equals y0. Then equation (3) is reduced to
x0 >
p
y0: First consider the case in which the population size is 20. Since 50%
of the population (10 individuals) are defectors, we need 4 punishers to elimi-
nate the defectors (4 > 3:1328  p10). However, if the size of the population
is 200, only 11 punishers are enough for 100 defectors (11 > 10  p100). In
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other words, when the group size is 20, about 15% of the population must be
punishers in order to get rid of the defectors, whereas in a group of size 200,
about 5% of the population will be enough.
3 Model and Analyses
3.1 Model
Consider a population of size n playing a public goods game. We suppose
that each member in the population can choose to be one of three types: co-
operator, punisher, or defector. Punishers (P) contribute to the public project
and punish defectors, defectors (D) do not contribute to the public goods,
and nally, cooperators (C) do not punish, but only contribute to the public
project. A member chooses types taking account of the e¤ect of this choice on
the costs he incurs because of ensuing conicts, which we call a punishment
process. In the punishment process, punishers and defectors have a series of
engagements described by Lanchesters equations. With the notation Ei = 1
if i contributes and Ei = 0 otherwise, member is expected payo¤s of each
type (or evaluation of utility upon adopting each type) reads
(P ) =
b
n
X
j
Ej   c  dPr(IP ) (4)
(D) =
b
n
X
j 6=i
Ej   sPr(ID) (5)
(C) =
b
n
X
j
Ej   c (6)
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where b denotes a benet from the public project and c is the cost of contri-
bution. We assume that c < b < nc; so in the absence of punishment it is
socially optimal for all members to contribute, while none of them have enough
material motivation to do so. The term Pr(IP ); which we will specify precisely
later, represents the probability with which punisher i would be injured or hurt
during the punishment process; if this happens he pays the cost d. Similarly,
defector i needs to pay s with the probability Pr(ID)  the probability of the
defector being injured. We assume that s > c; so the cost that the defector
pays in case of being injured   for example the cost of recovery from injury or
foregone income from the exclusion of productive activities because of injury
  is greater than the per-period contribution cost. Note that when d = s = 0;
no punishment takes place and payo¤s replicate the n-prisoner dilemma.
Though we use the language of public goods problems, we observe that this
setting can be readily extended to the situation of political collective actions
(Tullock, 1971; DeNardo, 1985; Epstein, 2002). In the context of revolutionary
activities to overthrow a corrupt and oppressive government, this setting mod-
els an individuals choice from among three activities: join the revolutionaries
(punisher), join the forces of repression (defector), or remain inactive (coop-
erator). With these name changes (4)(6) reproduce a similar specication
of expected payo¤s that Tullock (1971) used in his study of the paradox of
revolution.
We proceed to specify terms Pr(IP ) and Pr(IC) using Lanchesters theory.
First we introduce a parameter  to describe the degree of collectivityof the
defectors in the punishment process:
 =
1
the number of defectors who counteract together
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Figure 2 illustrates this parameter schematically.
Figure 2: Defectorstendency to act collectivelyin the punishment.
1

represents the number of defectors who act together in the punishment process. When
 = 1 all defectors behave individually in the punishing process and as  ! 0 defectors
behave more collectively.
For instance, when the number of punishers and the defectors are x and
y = 2021 and  = 1=1000, from a similar calculation the condition for the
punishers to defeat the armyof defectors is as follows:
x2  2 (1000)2 + 212 = [0:001 2021] ( 1
0:001
)2 + (2021  2000)2
where [x ] denotes the integer part of x. The rst term, 2 (1000)2, indicates
that the army of punishers faces 1000 defectors twice and then competes with
the remaining 21 defectors. Thus in general we have the following condition
for the punishers to annihilate all defectors:
x2  [y]

1

2
+ (y   [y]1

)2 (7)
where  > 0: Since a type is more likely to be injured or knocked out if
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the result of the punishment process is close to the defeat of that type, we
suppose that Pr(ID) and Pr(IP ) monotonically depends on (7). In particular,
we suppose that
Pr(ID) = F (x
2   [y]

1

2
  (y   [y]1

)2)
Pr(IP ) = 1  F (x2   [y]

1

2
  (y   [y]1

)2)
where F (t) increasing, lim
t!1
F (t) = 1; lim
t! 1
F (t) = 0: For example, F (t) =
1[0;1)(t); or F (t) = 1 if t  0 ; = exp(t) if t < 0:
3.2 Static Analysis
Using the model we have developed, we ask two questions: 1. How does an
increase in group size change P ; D; and C at a given time? 2. How does
an increase in group size a¤ect, at equilibrium, the proportion of each type in
the population when individuals update their types? The rst question ad-
dresses the static characterization of the model, while the second one concerns
equilibrium states in the dynamics of the model. Of course, these two are
closely related as the standard result in game theory suggests   for instance,
the strict Nash equilibrium in the underlying game is an evolutionarily stable
strategy, and hence the asymptotically stable state in the replicator dynamics
(See Weibull, 1995). Concerning the rst question, we have proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that  = x
n
;  = y
n
; and s > c: Then for all  > 0,
 > 0;  > 0, lim n!1 (P   D) > 0 and lim n!1 (C   D) > 0
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Proof. From the denition of Pr(ID) we have
Pr(ID) = F (
2n2   [n]

1

2
  (n   [n]1

)2)
! 1 as n!1
since
 (n   [n]1)2 = 2 (n   [n])2  2 : Then C   D  P  
D !  c+ s > 0.
Since C > D; whenever P > D holds, playing D is strictly dominated
by both strategies C and P: Figure 3 below characterizes the combinations of
the population proportion (; ; 1    ) which support P > D:
Figure 3: The fractions of population which support punishment.
Each point in the triangles uniquely corresponds to one population state, composed of
fractions of each type, through the Bary centric coordinate. For example, the point lo-
cated on the left bottom vertex corresponds to a population state in which all individuals
choose the defector type. The points in the shaded area are population states which ensure
Pr (IP ) = 1, so P D> 0;so in the shaded region playing defector is strictly dominated.
 = 0:5;  = ; F (t) = 1[0;1) are used.
In each panel of gure 3 the shaded regions show the population state where
playing defector is strictly dominated by punishers, and hence by cooperators.
In contrast, when x; y belong to the unshaded regions, we have Pr(IP )  1;
Pr(ID)  0; so D > P and D > C and playing defector is individually
12
rational. When the size of the group increases, the shaded region enlarges; be-
ing defector becomes less favorable. In addition, because of these features of
the payo¤s we may regard the shaded regions, in a suitable dynamic process,
as basins of attraction for some equilibrium supporting cooperation; unshaded
regions may correspond to the basins of attraction for an all-defectors equilib-
rium. The static analysis of the payo¤ structures and the basins of attraction
strongly suggests that cooperation would be supported in the long run.
3.3 Dynamic Analysis
We consider a state space n = f(x; y; z) 2 R3j x + y + z = n g;which
describes the numbers of punishers, defectors, and cooperators. Given that
the state at the end of period of t is (x; y; z); we write k(x; y) := k; for
k = P;D;C to emphasize the dependence of payo¤s on x; y: During the period
t+ 1
D1 A proportion of individuals is drawn from the population at random.
D2 With probability (1 ) for  2 (0; 1), the drawn individuals choose types
according to the following switching rule:
type i switch to type j if j 2 argmax
k
k(x; y)
Whenever target strategies are more than one, an individual is assumed
to choose one randomly.
D3 With probability , individuals choose types randomly and the system
moves into the next period.
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D2 is called a best response update (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1998) and
the specication of stochastic dynamics follows Young (1998) except for D1.
Instead of drawing one individual as Young (1998) does, we draw a proportion
of individuals. If we draw one individual at each period, the convergence speed
of the system to an equilibrium may slow down as n increases, so some positive
level of punishing and cooperating behaviors may persist simply due to the
sampling method. Since we wish to control this artifact and single out the large
group e¤ect from the irrelevant aspects of the modeling, we allow a proportion
of individuals to update their strategies. In D3, we allow for the possibility of
idiosyncratic behavior such as mistakes by individuals in choosing their best
response strategies following the standard evolutionary model (Kandori et al.,
1993; Young, 1998).
Since the independent randomness, which arises each period both by D1
and D3, accumulates in the system through time, the process follows a Markov
chain and the standard limit theorem for nite state Markov processes ap-
plies. In particular, D3 makes the chain irreducible and aperiodic, so we
have a unique invariant distribution . Since we are interested in the long
run equilibrium value of population fractions, playing cooperators, punishers,
and defectors, we estimate lim
t!1
E(Xt); lim
t!1
E(Yt); and lim
t!1
E(Zt) using a Monte
Carlo simulation (Madras, 2002). As we do not know an invariant distribu-
tion we take the all-defectors state as an initial state, which is the least likely
state to support a high level of cooperation in the long run. Figure 4 depicts
trajectories of the states of the system. In the rst panel, where the size of the
population is relatively small, the population state starting from all defectors
stays close to the all-defectors equilibrium. This may capture the situation in
which all individuals are trapped in the basin of attraction of the all-defectors
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Figure 4: The fractions of population in each period. Each point is
each state in the simulation. The initial values of states are taken as  = 0;  = 1;
 = 0: 10% of population are drawn at each period. Other parameters used are
 = 1;  = 1;  = 0:5;  = 0:1;  = 10; c = 2; d = 3; s = 3; T = 10000:
equilibrium in gure 3. The second panel shows that as the basin of attraction
for the all-defectors equilibrium shrinks, the system manages to escape from
this equilibrium and reach the state with higher levels of cooperation. The
estimates in table 1 corroborate the large group e¤ect more precisely. As the
size of the population grows, it becomes easier to prevent the proliferation of
defectors with a smaller fraction of punishers.
n = 90 n = 900
Punisher Defector Cooperator Punisher Defector Cooperator
fraction 0.03362 0.93242 0.03395 0.48231 0.033359 0.484325
95% Conf. [0.031855 [0.929807 [0.032531 [0.480872 [0.03275 [0.48274
Interval 0.0353861] 0.935051] 0.035368] 0.48376] 0.033960] 0.48591]
Table 1: Estimates of mean fractions of population. Estimates of the mean
fractions of population and 95% condence intervals. To estimate the mean fractions and
construct the condence intervals, we follow the batch means method (See Madras, 2002)
and choose 25 batches. Also to avoid the initialization bias the rst ve batches have been
dropped. The parameters used are the same as in gure 2.
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4 Discussion
We note two features of the model. When ! 0, the above argument fails
to hold in the limit. This is because if ! 0, meaning the defectors behave as
collectively as the punishers do, the punisher cannot exploit Lanchesters law.
However, proposition 1 does hold for all  > 0. As long as  remains positive
(even if  is very close to 0) or the defector tends to behave less collectively,
the punisher will always enjoy large group advantages. In addition, the result
does not depend on the magnitude of d. This means that, however high the
cost of punishment is, an increase in group size is always favors punishers and
cooperators. This fact suggests that the second-order free rider problem can
be reduced by the size of the group (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).
We have shown that if the punishment process is well described by Lanchesters
equations, larger groups may favor cooperation. Of course this argument does
not assert that larger groups are always successful in collective action; larger
groups may have other disadvantages   for instance, higher coordination costs
and information costs. However, by providing one instance of large-group ad-
vantages we verify that the Olsonian view of collective action and group size
does not always provide a correct answer. Moreover, an appropriately modi-
ed theory, for instance one incorporating coordination costs, would provide
better understanding of interesting questions of group and collective action
such as the determination of the optimal size of a group.
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